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INTRODUCTION 
There is no question that the laws that govern land use are vital to 
the structure, organization, and cohesiveness of a community. Land 
use laws can dictate the character and layout of a given area and also 
outline the role of government balanced against the rights of 
developers and residents. The application and interpretation of these 
laws are ultimately left to the judiciary, and it is through judicial 
opinion and case law that one may truly understand land use laws. 
This Article will examine Municipal Land Use Laws (MLUL) in the 
State of New Jersey by analyzing the boundaries and parameters the 
judiciary has set in its interpretation of the New Jersey MLUL. By 
way of said examination, this article may serve as a cautionary tale 
for both governmental and nongovernmental actors in avoidance of 
judicial intervention with regard to the most common and basic land 
use issues presented in the state at the local, municipal level. 
Foremost, however, a look into the federal-state-local regulatory 
interplay is an important starting point in understanding what 
authority local municipalities have with regard to land use laws. 
I 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGIN 
Article VI, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution, commonly 
known as the Supremacy Clause, establishes that the Constitution and 
all federal laws are the supreme law of the land.1 Therefore, the 
analysis of land use laws, like any other, starts at the federal level 
with an exploration of the U.S. Constitution. 
 
1 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
SEDARAT (DO NOT DELETE) 5/30/2018  1:50 PM 
2018] New Jersey Municipal Land Use Law:  167 
Constitutional Origin, Judicial Parameters 
Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, commonly known as the Property 
Clause, of the U.S. Constitution states, “Congress shall have Power to 
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the 
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and 
nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any 
Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.”2 
Article IV gives direct insight with regard to federal power over 
federally owned lands, and the Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal 
government from taking private property for public use, stating, “nor 
shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”3 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, commonly known as the Commerce 
Clause, allows the government to “regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”4  
The Commerce Clause gives the federal government broad power 
with regard to regulating private land, to the extent that the private 
land falls within the scope of Congress’ authority under the 
Commerce Clause. 
Therefore, we know that federally owned land is controlled by the 
federal government, that the federal government cannot “take” private 
land without just compensation, and further, that the federal 
government can control private land insomuch as it falls within the 
crosshairs of the Commerce Clause. Indeed, nothing else in the U.S. 
Constitution explicitly references authority over land. Consequently, 
figuring out states’ legislative power with regard to private land 
becomes somewhat of a process of elimination, that ends with the 
catchall Tenth Amendment. 
The Tenth Amendment states that “[t]he powers not delegated to 
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”5 In 
essence, if the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly reserve or prohibit 
a right one way or another, the right belongs to the State. The power 
vested in the states by the Tenth Amendment is commonly known as 
a State’s “police power.” The definition of “police power” has origins 
 
2 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
3 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
5 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
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dating back to 1851, derived from the court’s holding in 
Commonwealth v. Alger: 
[T]he police power [is] the power vested in the [state] legislature by 
the [U.S.] constitution, to make, ordain and establish all manner of 
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either 
with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they 
shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, 
and of the subjects of the same.6 
The police powers of a state are not finite or enumerated, but 
rather, they must fall within the scope of protecting the health, safety, 
and general welfare of the public.7 Over the course of the past century 
and a half, courts have been charged with the duty of determining the 
edges and ceiling of states’ police powers. Accordingly, by way of 
judicial determination, among the police powers vested in a state, is 
the power to regulate land use. Again, this inclusion dates back to 
Alger: 
Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are 
subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment, as shall 
prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints 
and regulations established by law, as the legislature, under the 
governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, 
may think necessary and expedient. This is very different from the 
right of eminent domain, the right of a government to take and 
appropriate private property to public use, whenever the public 
exigency requires it; which can be done only on condition of 
providing a reasonable compensation therefor. The power we allude 
to is rather the police power, the power vested in the [state] . . . .8 
Since Alger, courts have consistently upheld and solidified the 
inclusion of land use regulation under the umbrella of police power.9 
In Berman v. Parker, the United States Supreme Court also 
ultimately held that the determination of particular uses of a parcel of 
land definitively fell within permissible exercise of police power.10 In 
so holding, the Court noted the broad brushstroke of the application of 
police power: 
 
6 Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53, 85 (7 Cush.) (1851). 
7 Id.; see also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32–33 (1954). 
8 Alger, 61 Mass. at 85. 
9 Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 252, 105 A.3d 1082, 1090 (N.J. 2015) 
(citing Rumson Estates, Inc. v. Mayor of Fair Haven, 177 N.J. 338, 349, 828 A.2d 317, 
323–24 (N.J. 2003); Taxpayers Ass’n of Weymouth Twp. v. Weymouth Twp., 80 N.J. 6, 
20, 364 A.2d 1016, 1023–24 (N.J. 1976) (appeal dismissed and cert. denied sub nom.)). 
10 Berman, 348 U.S. at 32−33. 
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Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and 
order—these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the 
traditional application of the police power to municipal affairs. Yet 
they merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit it.   
. . . The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. . . . 
The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as 
well as monetary.11 
Now that we are in the catchall basin of the Tenth Amendment—
wherein we broadly defined the states’ police powers, and we have 
further determined that among those police powers is specifically the 
power of land use regulation—we must look to individual state 
constitutions to determine how states have retained and /or delegated 
the power of land use regulation. Pertinent to the discussion of this 
Article, we look specifically to the New Jersey State Constitution, 
which provides: 
The Legislature may enact general laws under which municipalities, 
other than counties, may adopt zoning ordinances limiting and 
restricting to specified districts and regulating therein, buildings and 
structures, according to their construction, and the nature and extent 
of their use, and the nature and extent of the uses of land, and the 
exercise of such authority shall be deemed to be within the police 
power of the State. Such laws shall be subject to repeal or alteration 
by the Legislature.12 
In fact, the legislature of the State of New Jersey, in exercising its 
aforementioned state constitutional authority, did enact laws under 
which the regulation of local land use is delegated to municipalities.  
These laws are commonly known as the Municipal Land Use Laws 
(MLUL), and are found at N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 et. seq. 
The MLUL is the substantive authority for all zoning and planning 
with regard to municipalities in the State of New Jersey. However, in 
order to completely understand the full breadth and limitations of the 
New Jersey MLUL, legislative language is not enough—one must 
examine judicial application and interpretation. 
 
11 Id. (citation omitted); accord Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 111 (1911), 
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 424 (1952). 
12 N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 6, para. 2. 
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II 
JUDICIAL PARAMETERS 
A. Invalidity 
1. Invalidity: Health, Safety, Morals, and General Welfare 
The MLUL is “a comprehensive statute that allows municipalities 
to adopt ordinances to regulate land development ‘in a manner which 
will promote the public health, safety, morals and general welfare’ 
using uniform and efficient procedures.”13 This language is derived 
directly from the statute itself, wherein one of the enumerated primary 
goals of MLUL is to “encourage municipal action to guide the 
appropriate use or development of all lands in this State, in a manner 
which will promote the public health, safety, morals, and general 
welfare[.]”14 
Moreover, this language is also clearly attached to the statute and 
the interpretation thereof through the judicial recognition that land use 
laws fall under the broad category of police powers; courts have 
consistently held that land use laws must promote the public health, 
safety, morals or general welfare to be constitutionally valid because 
land use regulation is a police power.15 This requirement effectively 
reigns in the otherwise unbounded constitutional delegation of power 
with regard to a municipality’s land use regulatory authority. “It is 
required that, affirmatively, a zoning regulation, like any police power 
enactment, must promote public health, safety, morals or the general 
welfare. (The last term seems broad enough to encompass the others.) 
Conversely, a zoning enactment which is contrary to the general 
welfare is invalid.”16 
Interestingly, the litmus test for compliance with the 
aforementioned requirement is not limited to the municipality’s 
health, safety, morals or general welfare, but rather, extends to also 
include that of the state.17 
 
13 Rumson Estates, 177 N.J. at 349, 828 A.2d at 323−24 (citing Levin v. Twp. of 
Parsippany–Troy Hills, 82 N.J. 174, 178–79, 411 A.2d 704, 706 (N.J. 1980)). 
14 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-2(a) (2017). 
15 See S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I), 67 N.J. 
151, 174, 336 A.2d 713, 725 (N.J. 1975). 
16 Id. at 175, 336 A.2d at 725 (emphasis added). 
17 See Duffcon Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509, 513, 64 A.2d 
347, 350 (N.J. 1949); Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 247–49, 
104 A.2d 441, 446–47 (N.J. 1954); Roman Catholic Diocese of Newark v. Borough of Ho- 
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[I]t is fundamental and not to be forgotten that the zoning power is a 
police power of the state and the local authority is acting only as a 
delegate of that power and is restricted in the same manner as is the 
state. So, when regulation does have a substantial external impact, 
the welfare of the state’s citizens beyond the borders of the 
particular municipality cannot be disregarded and must be 
recognized and served.18 
Indeed, it is imperative that a municipality’s land use laws foremost 
are enacted to promote both local and state public health, safety, 
morals, or general welfare in order to survive initial constitutional 
scrutiny and potential invalidation. 
2. Invalidity: Strict Adherence to the Mandates of MLUL 
It is clear that land use regulation falls within the scope of the 
state’s police power delegated to municipalities, and that an ordinance 
can be invalidated for failure to promote the public health, safety, 
morals, or general welfare. In addition, however, courts have further 
restricted municipalities’ implementation of land use ordinances by 
requiring that such ordinances be adopted strictly in accordance with 
MLUL, the enabling statute.19 
In New Jersey Shore Builders Ass’n v. Township of Jackson, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court, in affirming the appellate division’s 
decision, found that the municipalities lacked authority to promulgate 
the specific ordinances in question, as the MLUL conferred no such 
authority to them.20 Specifically, the court found that the municipal 
ordinances, which required the developers to set aside open space, 
were not contemplated by the MLUL for the specific type of 
development in question.21 In reaching this conclusion, the court 
relied on the fact that the MLUL did contemplate and explicitly 
 
Ho-Kus, 42 N.J. 556, 573–74  202 A.2d 161, 170 (N.J. 1964); Kunzler v. Hoffman, 48 
N.J. 277, 288, 225 A.2d 321, 327 (N.J. 1966). 
18 Mount Laurel I, 67 N.J. at 177, 336 A.2d at 726 (emphasis added) (citing Village of 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926)). 
19 See N.J. Shore Builders Ass’n v. Twp. of Jackson, 199 N.J. 449, 454, 972 A.2d 1151, 
1154 (N.J. 2009) (“municipalities must exercise their powers relating to zoning and land 
use in a manner that will strictly conform with that statute’s provisions.”). See also Toll 
Bros., Inc. v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 194 N.J. 223, 243, 944 A.2d 1, 12 (2008); 
Avalon Home & Land Owners Ass’n v. Borough of Avalon, 111 N.J. 205, 212, 543 A.2d 
950, 954 (N.J. 1988); N.J. Builders Ass’n v. Mayor of Bernards Twp., 108 N.J. 223, 237–
38, 528 A.2d 555, 562 (N.J. 1987). 
20 N.J. Shore Builders, 199 N.J. at 454, 972 A.2d at 1154. 
21 Id. at 452, 972 A.2d at 1152–53. 
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authorize promulgations of ordinances related to open space 
requirements in other types of developments, namely, Planned Unit 
Development (PUD).22 In short, the court found that because the 
MLUL did not authorize an open space requirement for the 
developments at issue but did for other types of developments, the 
legislature did not intend for the requirement to be applied.23 
Consequently, the lack of explicit MLUL authorization rendered the 
municipalities’ ordinances invalid.24 The court held that “[t]he MLUL 
is a carefully constructed and comprehensive framework governing 
the powers of municipalities relating to land use and development. As 
we have previously held, municipalities must exercise their powers 
relating to zoning and land use in a manner that will strictly conform 
with that statute’s provisions.”25 
Indeed, to the extent that a municipality enacts a land use 
ordinance that surpasses the specific confines of the MLUL, courts 
will invalidate the ordinance, thus, voiding the actions related thereto: 
A municipality, in exercising the zoning powers delegated to it, 
must act within such delegated powers [within the MLUL] and 
cannot go beyond them, and where a statute sets forth the procedure 
to be followed, no governing body or subdivision thereof can adopt 
any other method of procedure. . . . When a statutory power is 
exercised in a manner that could not have been within the 
contemplation of and produces a result that could not have been 
foreseen by the Legislature, such exercise of powers must be 
restrained within proper bounds by being held void.26 
Furthermore, courts have held that a municipality cannot divorce 
itself from its obligation under MLUL and conflicting municipal 
ordinances cannot usurp the authority of MLUL.27 In Nouhan v. 
Board of Adjustment of City of Clifton, plaintiff-Nouhan, who resided 
near the pub at issue, sued after exhausting appropriate avenues 
before the Board of Adjustment, because the intervener-pub owner 
was operating a restaurant that essentially turned into a nightclub 
 
22 Id. at 452, 972 A.2d at 1152. 
23 Id. at 452–53, 972 A.2d at 1153. 
24 Id., 972 A.2d at 1152–53. 
25 Id. at 452, 972 A.2d at 1153. 
26 Pop Realty Corp. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Springfield Twp., 176 N.J. Super. 441, 
452, 423 A.2d 688, 694 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980) (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). 
27 See Nouhan v. Bd. of Adjustment of Clifton, 392 N.J.Super. 283, 290, 920 A.2d 700, 
704 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007). 
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during evenings and weekends.28 The restaurant had an entertainment 
license, which the municipality’s legislative body granted, that 
allowed operation as a nightclub; however, the city-zoning ordinance 
relative to the location of the restaurant did not allow for such use.29  
Essentially, the zoning ordinance prohibited operation of the 
nightclub, yet the municipality granted a licensing permit for said 
operation.30 Of particular note, the Board denied plaintiff relief by 
deferring to the permitting authority;31 the court found this to be 
improper given the fact that the issue fell within the zoning authority 
given to the Board through the MLUL.32 The court held that, although 
the municipality had the power to license and regulate nightclubs by 
way of their permitting authority, “the issuance of a license to a 
regulated business does not authorize a use of land that is not 
permitted under the zoning ordinance.”33 Therefore, the court 
remanded to the Board, holding that the Board of Adjustment erred 
(as did the lower court) in finding that the issue at hand should be 
resolved as a permitting issue and not as a zoning issue.34 
Furthermore, the court held that the Board was required to hear and 
decide the case due to its exclusive obligation to do so under MLUL, 
stating: 
The MLUL confers authority upon the board of adjustment to 
“[h]ear and decide appeals where it is alleged by the appellant that 
there is error in any order, requirement, decision or refusal made by 
an administrative officer based on or made in the enforcement of 
the zoning ordinance [.]” The board of adjustment is also authorized 
to interpret the zoning ordinance. These powers of a board of 
adjustment are exclusive. Therefore, the board of adjustment must 
hear and decide any claim that a zoning officer has misinterpreted 
or failed to enforce the municipal zoning ordinance.35 
In short, the court found that when a land use or zoning issue is 
involved, the permitting authority cannot usurp and replace the power 
of the MLUL and, further, that the Board of Adjustment must hear 
and decide the case because it is required to by MLUL. 
 
28 Id. at 289, 920 A.2d at 704. 
29 Id. at 287–88, 920 A.2d at 702–03. 
30 Id. at 289, 920 A.2d at 703–04. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 291, 920 A.2d at 705. 
33 Id. at 292, 920 A.2d at 705. 
34 Id. at 294, 920 A.2d at 707. 
35 Id. at 291, 920 A.2d at 705 (citations omitted). 
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It is abundantly clear that an ordinance can be invalidated if it fails 
to strictly adhere to the confines of MLUL, and it should be 
simultaneously noted that courts have generally construed the MLUL 
in favor of the municipality while balancing the developers’ 
constitutional rights and legitimate interests: 
Whenever reasonably possible, the MLUL should be construed in 
favor of the governmental authority so as to protect the public and 
not to frustrate the purpose of the enactment. . . . [However,] the 
rule that all statutory interpretation should be reasonably construed 
favorably toward governmental authority should not be applied so 
strictly as to impinge on the legitimate interests of developers. They 
are entitled to procedural due process and substantive fairness.36 
3. Invalidity: Riggs Four-Part Test 
The New Jersey Supreme Court utilized a four-part validity test in 
the 1988 case Riggs v. Long Beach Township, proscribing four 
distinct requirements that must be satisfied for a municipal land use 
ordinance to be valid.37 The ordinance (or amendment) must (1) 
advance one of the general statutory purposes of the MLUL; (2) be 
consistent with the Master Plan; (3) comply with constitutional 
constraints; and (4) adhere to procedural requirements.38 
a. Ordinance Must Satisfy at Least One of the Purposes of MLUL 
In Riggs, the property owner applied to subdivide the property in 
question into four sub-lots.39 In response, the Township rejected the 
application and advised that it intended to acquire the property 
through contract or eminent domain.40 The Township did neither and, 
instead, subsequently adopted a Master Plan which included the 
property owner’s lots as designated public open space.41 Thereafter, 
despite the Master Plan, the Township amended the zoning ordinance 
relevant to the property owner’s four lots, wherein subdividing as 
planned would still be permissible.42 The Township, which still 
wanted to acquire the property, engaged in extensive negotiations 
with the property owner, which included a battle of conflicting 
 
36 Gunthner v. Planning Bd. of Bay Head, 335 N.J.Super. 452, 463, 762 A.2d 710, 716 
(N.J. Super Ct. Law Div. 2000) (citations omitted). 
37 Riggs v. Twp. of Long Beach, 109 N.J. 601, 611–12, 538 A.2d 808, 813 (N.J. 1988). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 604, 538 A.2d at 809. 
40 Id. at 604–05, 538 A.2d at 809. 
41 Id. at 605, 538 A.2d at 809. 
42 Id. 
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appraisals.43 When negotiations fell through, the Township—after 
instituting an unsuccessful suit against the property owner for specific 
performance of an alleged agreement to sale—again amended the 
relevant zoning ordinance such that the property owner could only 
subdivide the lot into two subsections, rather than the desired four.44 
The property owner filed suit, alleging that the sole purpose of the 
rezoning was to diminish the property value so that the Township 
could lower the market value and acquire the property at a lower price 
via eminent domain.45 The trial court found in favor of the property 
owner.46 However, the appellate division reversed, finding that the 
rezoning was supported by purposes stated in the Master Plan, 
namely, “‘protecting the natural resources and amenities of the 
Township [along] the bayshore and oceanfront,’ and maintaining the 
‘single family-oriented low density character of the community by 
upgrading minimum lot sizes where possible and limiting multi-
family housing development.’ (quoting the Master Plan).”47 The 
appellate division found that, in a situation where property is intended 
to be acquired by the Township and will likely be developed prior to 
such acquisition, “a zoning ordinance restricting development to the 
lowest possible density has a valid purpose because the restriction to 
low-density development facilitates acquisition of the property and 
establishment of the public use.”48 
The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the appellate division’s 
reasoning, reversed, and invalidated the ordinance.49 The court did so 
primarily based on the Township’s failure to satisfy the first criterion 
of the above referenced four-part test, which requires the zoning 
ordinance be enacted pursuant to one of the fifteen general purposes 
listed in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2.50 Although two listed statutory purposes 
are providing open space and, also, promoting the public health, 
safety, morals, and general welfare, the court found that “[a]n 
ordinance enacted solely to reduce the municipality’s cost of 
 
43 Id. at 605, 538 A.2d at 810. 
44 Id. at 606, 538 A.2d at 810. 
45 Id. at 607, 538 A.2d at 810. 
46 Id. at 610, 538 A.2d at 812. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 617, 538 A.2d at 815–16. 
50 Id. at 612, 538 A.2d at 813. 
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acquisition of the land affected by the ordinance, however, does not 
fulfill a valid zoning purpose.”51 
In discussing the requirement that a valid purpose under N.J.S.A. 
40:55D-2 is satisfied, the court distinguished between the actual 
purpose of the ordinance, which is dependent on objective factors, 
and the motive for enacting the ordinance, which involves subjective 
consideration.52 The court stated: 
 In determining whether the ordinance was adopted for an 
unlawful purpose, we distinguish between the purpose of the 
ordinance and the motives of those who enacted it. . . . Although the 
distinction between motive and purpose can be fuzzy, “motive” 
ordinarily addresses the subjective considerations that move a 
legislator, and “purpose” speaks to the goals to be achieved. The 
determination of “purpose” depends on objective factors . . . . 
 . . . If, however, the ordinance has but one purpose and that 
purpose is unlawful, courts may declare the ordinance invalid. 
Hence, when a party challenging an ordinance asserts that it was 
adopted for the improper purpose of depressing the value of the 
property in a condemnation proceeding, the court may seek to 
ascertain the municipality’s true purpose in enacting the ordinance. 
This inquiry should be limited to an evaluation of the objective facts 
surrounding the adoption of the ordinance.53 
The court found that although the Township’s arguable motive in 
rezoning may have been to secure open space, its actual purpose—
namely, “depressing the value of property that the municipality seeks 
to acquire through condemnation”—was not a listed permissible 
statutory purpose.54 Therefore, the court concluded that the ordinance 
was unlawful and rendered it invalid.55 
b. Ordinance Must Be Consistent with the Master Plan 
N.J.S.A. 40:55D-5 defines the Master Plan as “a composite of one 
or more written or graphic proposals for the development of the 
municipality as set forth in and adopted pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 40:55D-
28],”56 which sets forth requirements for the preparation, contents, 
and modification of the Master Plan. N.J.S.A. 40:55D-28(a) provides 
that “[t]he planning board may prepare and, after public hearing, 
 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 613, 538 A.2d at 813–14. 
53 Id. (citation omitted). 
54 Id. at 612, 538 A.2d at 813. 
55 Id. at 617, 538 A.2d at 815–16. 
56 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-5 (2017). 
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adopt or amend a [M]aster [P]lan or component parts thereof, to guide 
the use of lands within the municipality in a manner which protects 
public health and safety and promotes the general welfare.”57 
Furthermore, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-28(b) requires that the Master Plan 
“comprise a report or statement and land use and development 
proposals, with maps, diagrams and text, presenting, at least the 
following elements (1) and (2) and, where appropriate, the following 
elements (3) through (16).”58 Essentially, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-28(b) lists 
sixteen different elements for inclusion in the Master Plan, however, 
only two are not discretionary and are mandatorily required, namely: 
(1) a statement of objectives, principles, assumptions, policies and 
standards upon which the constituent proposals for the physical, 
economic and social development of the municipality are based; and 
(2) a land use plan element.59 
Consistency between an enacted ordinance and the Master Plan is 
the second criterion of the Riggs four-part test.60 This requirement is 
derived from the statutory requirement under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62(a) 
which states that “all of the provisions of such zoning ordinance or 
any amendment or revision thereto shall either be substantially 
consistent with the land use plan element and the housing plan 
element of the [M]aster [P]lan or designed to effectuate such plan 
elements.”61 The statute goes on to provide for an exception, which 
permits the governing body to adopt an ordinance or amendment that 
is inconsistent with the land use and housing plan elements of the 
Master Plan if there is a majority vote in favor of it, provided that the 
governing body sets forth the reasons for the inconsistency “in a 
resolution and recorded in its minutes.”62 
Although the first part of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62(a) is seemingly 
straightforward, the New Jersey Supreme Court has taken pause with 
regard to what “substantially consistent” actually means in 
application. In the 1995 New Jersey Supreme Court case Manalapan 
Realty, L.P. v. Township Committee of the Township of Manalapan, 
the plaintiff-appellant-shopping center owner applied for site plan 
approval to expand the existing commercial-retail space to include a 
 
57 Id. § 40:55D-28(a). 
58 Id. § 40:55D-28(b). 
59 See id. 
60 Riggs, 109 N.J. at 611, 538 A.2d at 813. 
61 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-62(a) (2017). 
62 Id. 
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Home Depot.63 Under the then-existing zoning ordinance, the Home 
Depot was a permitted retail store.64 After significant public 
opposition to the store, the Township adopted two amendments to the 
zoning ordinance, which defined retail stores to exclude any 
establishment that sold building materials, thereby precluding the 
proposed expansion by the plaintiff-appellant.65 The Board found the 
adoption of the amendments to be consistent with the Master Plan.66 
Plaintiff-appellant then initiated suit to challenge the validity of the 
amended ordinances.67 The trial court found that the amendments 
were invalid, and that expanding the site to include a Home Depot 
was a permissible use under the previous ordinance, which was to be 
reinstated as a result of the court’s invalidation of the amendments.68 
The Township appealed, and the appellate division reversed, finding 
the amendments were properly adopted and consistent with the 
Master Plan.69 The plaintiff-appellant argued that the Master Plan, 
which was adopted two months before the enactment of the 
amendments and while the site approval application was pending, 
failed to address and reject the Home Depot as a permissible use.70 
The Township argued that “because the Master Plan is expressed in 
general terms it is of limited relevance in determining whether Home 
Depot is a permitted use.”71 The New Jersey Supreme Court found in 
favor of the Township, holding that because the Master Plan did not 
overtly disapprove of the Home Depot application, and because 
N.J.S.A. 40:55D-65(a) “authorized the Township through its zoning 
ordinance to ‘[l]imit and restrict buildings and structures . . . 
according to their type and the nature and extent of their use,’” the 
amendments were consistent with the Master Plan and therefore, were 
valid.72 
The court in Manalapan Realty further acknowledged that N.J.S.A. 
40:55D-62(a) required ordinances and amendments to be 
 
63 Manalapan Realty v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 372, 658 A.2d 1230, 
1233 (N.J. 1995). 
64 Id. at 373, 658 A.2d at 1234. 
65 Id. at 373–74, 658 A.2d at 1233–34. 
66 Id. at 374, 658 A.2d at 1234. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 374–75, 658 A.2d at 1234–35. 
69 Id. at 375–76, 658 A.2d at 1235. 
70 Id. 379–80, 658 A.2d at 1237. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 383, 658 A.2d at 1239. 
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“substantially consistent” with the Master Plan and concluded that the 
plain meaning of the phrase actually allows for some inconsistency 
between adopted ordinances and the Master Plan.73 In the court’s own 
words: 
The Legislature has not defined what is meant by “substantially 
consistent” with a Master Plan. “When construing legislation, in the 
absence of a specific definition, we give words their ordinary and 
well-understood meanings. . . .” The only interpretation of 
“substantially consistent” that will not defeat the objective of the 
MLUL is to give these words their plain meaning. Substantial 
means “[h]aving substance; not imaginary, unreal, or apparent only; 
true, solid, real, or, having real existence, not imaginary[;] firmly 
based, a substantial argument.” Thus, the concept of “substantially 
consistent” permits some inconsistency, provided it does not 
substantially or materially undermine or distort the basic provisions 
and objectives of the Master Plan.74 
The court found that the ordinance did not so undermine and distort 
the Master Plan and relied on that conclusion in its position that the 
amendments were, in fact, valid.75 
The New Jersey Supreme Court has further taken this relaxed 
interpretation of “substantially consistent,” and coupled it with the 
second part of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62(a) which provides for an exception 
to the consistency requirement; the court has concluded that, 
ultimately and plainly, a governing body may not make its decision to 
adhere to or deviate from the Master Plan “arbitrarily.”76 
c. Ordinance Must Comport with Constitutional Constraints 
The third criterion of the Riggs test is that “the ordinance must 
comport with constitutional constraints on the zoning power, namely, 
those pertaining to due process, equal protection, and the prohibition 
against confiscation.”77 
 
73 Id. at 382–84, 658 A.2d at 1239–40. 
74 Id. (citations omitted). 
75 Id. at 384–85, 658 A.2d at 1239–40. 
76 Riya Finnegan LLC v. Twp. Council of S. Brunswick, 197 N.J. 184, 189, 962 A.2d 
484, 493 (N.J. 2008). 
77 Riggs v. Twp. of Long Beach, 109 N.J. 601, 611–12, 538 A.2d 808, 813 (N.J. 1988) 
(citations omitted); see also Home Builders League of S. Jersey, Inc. v. Twp. of Berlin, 81 
N.J. 127, 405 A.2d 381 (N.J. 1979) (discussing due process); S. Burlington Cty. NAACP 
v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 92 N.J. 158, 208–09, 456 A.2d 390, 415 (N.J. 
1983) (discussing due process and equal protection); AMG Assocs. v. Twp. of Springfield,  
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i. Due Process 
In Berger v. State of New Jersey, the court sought to determine 
whether a zoning ordinance limiting the area in question to single 
family dwellings required a group home for special needs pre-school 
children, located in the area, to cease operations.78 The property was 
deeded by gift to the New Jersey State Department of Institutions and 
Agencies (“the State”) for the aforementioned exclusive use, namely 
the care of special needs children under the age of nine.79 The deed 
specified that if the property was not used in this proscribed way, it 
would revert to the grantor, and, further, that the conveyance would 
be subject to the local Borough’s zoning ordinances.80 The State 
entered into an agreement with the Borough providing that no more 
than twelve children would reside on the property at any one time and 
that the structure would conform to the aesthetics of the neighboring 
area.81 The plaintiffs owned property near the site and initiated suit to 
prevent the State’s proposed use of the property on the grounds that, 
“first . . . the intended use . . . would constitute a clear violation of the 
negative reciprocal covenants contained in deeds of record 
establishing a neighborhood scheme of single family residences, and 
second . . . the proposed use would contravene [the Borough’s] 
zoning ordinance restricting the area to single family dwellings.”82 
With regard to the second grounds for challenge, the court found that 
the ordinance’s definition of “family” was excessively narrow, and as 
such, violated due process.83 The court acknowledged the State’s 
interest in allowing municipalities to zone freely, but held that an 
ordinance that is overly restrictive on property rights denies owners of 
their property without due process, and is thus impermissible.84 The 
court stated: 
[W]hile municipalities are free to zone in such a way as will best 
attain these values, and to prohibit from such areas any use which 
threatens to erode such values or destroy the residential character of 
the area, all restrictions must, at the same time, satisfy the demands 
 
65 N.J. 101, 111–12, 319 A.2d 705, 710 (N.J. 1974) (discussing prohibition against 
confiscation). 
78 Berger v. New Jersey, 71 N.J. 206, 210, 364 A.2d 993, 995 (1976). 
79 Id. at 210–11, 364 A.2d at 995. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 212, 364 A.2d at 996. 
83 Id. at 224, 364 A.2d at 1002. 
84 Id. at 224–25, 364 A.2d at 1003. 
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of due process. Substantive due process requires that zoning 
regulations be reasonably exercised; they may be neither 
unreasonable, arbitrary nor capricious. The means chosen must have 
a real and substantial relation to the end sought to be achieved. 
Moreover, the regulation must be reasonably designed to resolve the 
problem without imposing unnecessary and excessive restrictions 
on the use of private property.85 
Consequently, to the extent that an ordinance is unreasonably over-
restrictive such that property rights are denied, it runs the risk of 
invalidation as a violation of due process.86 
ii. Equal Protection 
With regard to equal protection, it is well settled that zoning 
ordinances proscribing use restrictions must be “general and uniform 
in the particular district.”87 Furthermore, equal protection principles 
of land use mandate that: 
equality of right forbidding arbitrary discrimination between 
persons similarly circumstanced . . . [and] [a]rbitrary discrimination 
in the purported exercise of the [police] power would violate the 
essence of the constitutional authority and the cited enabling statute 
and infringe the substance of due process and work a denial of the 
equal protection of the laws.88 
Perhaps no set of cases illustrate the judiciary’s determination to 
protect due process and equal protection better than Mount Laurel I 
and Mount Laurel II, which set forth the famous Mount Laurel 
doctrine. 
In Mount Laurel I, the township of Mount Laurel had a general 
zoning ordinance that zoned land within the township as mostly 
industrial or residential.89 Of the industrially-zoned land, industrial 
uses occupied only approximately 2.5%, with the remainder 
 
85 Id. at 223–24, 364 A.2d at 1002 (citation omitted). 
86 Id. at 223, 364 A.2d at 1002; see also Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. Margate City, 112 
N.J. Super. 341, 350, 271 A.2d 430, 434 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1970); Home Builders 
League of S. Jersey, Inc. v. Twp. of Berlin, 81 N.J. 127, 137–38, 405 A.2d 381, 387 (N.J. 
1979). 
87 Schmidt v. Bd. of Adjustment, 9 N.J. 405, 418, 88 A.2d 607, 613 (N.J. 1952) (citing 
Brandon v. Bd. Of Comm’rs, 124 N.J.L. 135, 141, 11 A.2d 304, 308 (N.J. 1940); Murphy, 
Inc. v. Town of Westport, 40 A.2d 177, 182 (Conn. 1944); Miller v. Bd. of Public Works, 
234 P. 381 (Cal. 1925), writ of error dismissed, 273 U.S. 781 (1927); Pacific Palisades 
Ass’n v. City of Huntington Beach, 237 P. 538 (Cal. 1925)). 
88 Schmidt, 9 N.J. at 418, 88 A.2d at 613. 
89 Mount Laurel I, 67 N.J. at 161–64, 336 A.2d at 718–20. 
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unoccupied.90 Of the residentially-zoned land, all districts were 
restricted to single-family, detached dwellings, with a one house limit 
per lot; under the general ordinance, attached townhouses, 
apartments, and mobile homes were prohibited anywhere in the 
township.91 Further, each residential district had relatively substantial 
minimum lot area and minimum dwelling floor area requirements.92 
Additionally, in the industrial and residential districts, four PUD 
projects were to be constructed that would be comprised of multi-
family medium and high-rise apartments and attached townhouses 
embodying approximately 10,000 residential sale/rental housing 
units.93 The units, however, would only be within the financial reach 
of persons with a medium to upper income and restrictions were in 
place on the number of bedrooms and children permissible in each 
unit.94 
The Mount Laurel I court found that the record proved, in whole, 
that with regard to the general zoning ordinances and the details of the 
PUD developments, the township “acted affirmatively to control 
development and to attract a selective [namely a middle- and upper-
income] type of [population] growth.”95 The court further noted that 
the motivation for this ordinance was to keep local property taxes 
down “without regard for non-fiscal considerations with respect to 
people, either within or without its boundaries.”96 The underlying 
logic behind this, the court recognized, was “the fewer the school 
children, the lower the tax rate,” because New Jersey’s tax structure 
imposes the cost of primary and secondary education on local real 
estate.97 The court went on to note that Mount Laurel’s actions and 
motivations are not unique to the township: 
 
90 Id. at 162–63, 336 A.2d at 719. 
91 Id. at 163, 336 A.2d at 719. 
92 Id. at 164–65, 336 A.2d at 719–20. 
93 Id. at 167, 336 A.2d at 721. Planned unit development (PUD) is a land development 
whose placement and type is determined through an agreement between the developer and 
the municipality, outside of the normal scheme of local zoning and planning legislation, 
while still remaining within the confines of state enabling statutes and local implementing 
ordinances. Id. at 166, 336 A.2d at 720–21. 
94 Id. at 167, 336 A.2d at 721. 
95 Id. at 170, 336 A.2d at 722–23 (quoting S. Burlington Cty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount 
Laurel Twp., 119 N.J.Super. 164, 168, 290 A.2d 465, 467 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1972)). 
96 Id., 336 A.2d at 723 (emphasis in original). 
97 Id. at 171, 336 A.2d at 723. 
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 This pattern of land use regulation has been adopted for the same 
purpose in developing municipality after developing municipality. 
Almost every one acts solely in its own selfish and parochial 
interest and in effect builds a wall around itself to keep out those 
people or entities not adding favorably to the tax base, despite the 
location of the municipality or the demand for varied kinds of 
housing.98 
In its legal analysis, the court noted that the power to zone is a 
police power, and, as such, must promote general welfare.99 Housing, 
which is a basic human need, is a prime consideration in assessing the 
general welfare of citizens.100 As a police power, zoning ordinances 
“must conform to the basic state constitutional requirements of 
substantive due process and equal protection of the laws.”101 Here, the 
court required a broader interpretation of the general welfare, and 
such constitutional protections so as to include the “presumptive 
obligation on the part of developing municipalities at least to afford 
the opportunity by land use regulations for appropriate housing for 
all.”102 In the court’s words: 
 We have spoken of [the municipalities’ obligation to provide 
appropriate housing for all through land use regulations] as 
“presumptive.” The term has two aspects, procedural and 
substantive. Procedurally, we think the basic importance of 
appropriate housing for all dictates that, when it is shown that a 
developing municipality in its land use regulations has not . . . 
afford[ed] the opportunity for low and moderate income housing or 
has expressly prescribed requirements or restrictions which 
preclude or substantially hinder it, a facial showing of violation of 
substantive due process or equal protection under the state 
constitution has been made out and the burden, and it is a heavy 
one, shifts to the municipality to establish a valid basis for its action 
or non-action. The substantive aspect of “presumptive” relates to 
 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 174–75, 336 A.2d at 725. 
100 Id. at 178, 336 A.2d at 727 (“This brings us to the relation of housing to the concept 
of general welfare just discussed and the result in terms of land use regulation which that 
relationship mandates. There cannot be the slightest doubt that shelter, along with food, 
are the most basic human needs. ‘The question of whether a citizenry has adequate and 
sufficient housing is certainly one of the prime considerations in assessing the general 
health and welfare of that body.’”). 
101 Id. at 174, 336 A.2d at 725; see also N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 1; Robinson v. Cahill, 
62 N.J. 473, 482, 490–92, 303 A.2d 273, 277 (N.J. 1973); Wash. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Bd. of 
Review of N.J. Unemployment Compensation Comm’n, 1 N.J. 545, 553–54, 64 A.2d 443, 
447 (N.J. 1949)). 
102 Mount Laurel I, 67 N.J. at 180, 336 A.2d at 728. 
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the specifics, on the one hand, of what municipal land use 
regulation provisions, or the absence thereof, will evidence 
invalidity and shift the burden of proof and, on the other hand, of 
what bases and considerations will carry the municipality’s burden 
and sustain what it has done or failed to do.103 
The court found that Mount Laurel’s general “zoning ordinance 
[was] presumptively contrary to the general welfare,” and therefore, a 
facial showing of a due process and equal protection violation had 
been established.104 The burden then shifted to the municipality to 
show valid prevailing reasons to overcome the presumption, and the 
court found that the municipality failed to meet its burden.105 The 
court then, with the earlier noted foundational assertion that Mount 
Laurel was not unique in its pattern of exclusionary land use 
regulation, went a step further.106 In what is commonly known as the 
Mount Laurel doctrine, the court set forth the requirement that every 
developing municipality must affirmatively “afford the opportunity 
for decent and adequate low and moderate income housing,” which 
“extends at least to the municipality’s fair share of the present and 
prospective regional need therefore.”107 
Eight years later, the details of this affirmative obligation became 
the subject of Mount Laurel II, in which the New Jersey Supreme 
Court responded to “widespread non-compliance with the [equal 
protection and due process] constitutional mandate[s]” of Mount 
Laurel I.108 The court in Mount Laurel II emphasized the 
constitutional basis for the Mount Laurel doctrine: 
[T]hose regulations that do not provide the requisite opportunity for 
a fair share of the region’s need for low and moderate income 
housing . . . violate the state constitutional requirements of 
substantive due process and equal protection. . . . [This] doctrine 
does not arise from some theoretical analysis of our Constitution, 
but rather from underlying concepts of fundamental fairness in the 
exercise of governmental power. The basis for the constitutional 
obligation is simple: the State controls the use of land, all of the 
land. In exercising that control it cannot favor rich over poor. It 
cannot legislatively set aside dilapidated housing in urban ghettos 
for the poor and decent housing elsewhere for everyone else. The 
government that controls this land represents everyone. While the 
 
103 Id. at 180–81, 336 A.2d at 728 (citations omitted). 
104 Id. at 185, 336 A.2d at 730. 
105 Id. at 185–91, 336 A.2d at 730–33. 
106 Id. at 188, 336 A.2d at 732. 
107 Id. 
108 Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 199, 456 A.2d at 410. 
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State may not have the ability to eliminate poverty, it cannot use 
that condition as the basis for imposing further disadvantages. And 
the same applies to the municipality, to which this control over land 
has been constitutionally delegated.109 
The court in Mount Laurel II sought primarily to ensure that the 
constitutional protections envisioned by Mount Laurel I would be 
appropriately adhered to, and additionally, sought to “put some steel” 
to the Mount Laurel doctrine.110 
By way of deciding the issues in the consolidated cases before it,111 
the Mount Laurel II court most notably “put some steel” to the Mount 
Laurel doctrine by providing a multidimensional holding, which 
included the finding that the affirmative obligation to provide low 
income housing is no longer limited to developing municipalities, but 
rather, extends to every municipality, any portion of which falls 
within the “growth area,” as so designated by the State Development 
Guide Plan.112 The court also discussed at length what would 
constitute a municipality’s “fair share” of the regional need for low-
income housing, and further mandated that the municipality must 
provide low-income housing opportunities that are the “substantial 
equivalent of [that] fair share.”113 
In order to be in compliance with the Mount Laurel doctrine, the 
court held, municipalities must first eliminate all zoning and 
subdivision restrictions and requirements that do not serve as a 
protection of health and safety, and rather, act as “barriers to 
construction of their fair share of low[] income housing.”114 However, 
 
109 Id. at 208–09, 456 A.2d at 415. 
110 Id. at 200, 456 A.2d at 410. 
111 Mount Laurel II is a consolidation of six cases: Southern Burlington Cty N.A.A.C.P. 
v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 161 N.J.Super. 317, 391 A.2d 935 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1978); Urban League of Essex Co. v. Twp. of Mahwah, 207 N.J.Super 169, 504 A.2d 66 
(N.J. Super Ct. Law Div. 1979); Glenview Dev. Co. v. Franklin Twp., 164 N.J.Super. 563, 
397 A.2d 384 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978); Caputo v. Twp. of Chester, Docket No. L-
42857-74 (Law Div. Oct. 4, 1978) (unreported); Urban League of Greater New Brunswick 
v. Mayor of Borough of Carteret, 142 N.J.Super. 11, 359 A.2d 526 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. 
Div. 1976), rev’d Urban League of Greater New Brunswick v. Mayor of Borough of 
Carteret, 170 N.J.Super. 461, 406 A.2d 1322 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.1979); Round 
Valley, Inc. v. Twp. of Clinton, Docket No. L-29710-74 (Feb. 24, 1978) (unreported) 
rev’d Round Valley, Inc. v. Twp. of Clinton, 173 N.J. Super. 45, 413 A.2d 356 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980). 
112 Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 215, 456 A.2d at 418. 
113 Id. at 216, 456 A.2d at 419. 
114 Id. at 258–59, 456 A.2d at 441. 
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if removing these barriers does little, in practical application, to afford 
a realistic opportunity for construction of low-income housing, then 
the municipality is also required to take further affirmative measures, 
namely: “(1) encouraging or requiring the use of available state or 
federal housing subsidies, and (2) providing incentives for or 
requiring private developers to set aside a portion of their 
developments for lower income housing.”115 
The court also provided remedies if a municipality fails to adhere 
to the Mount Laurel doctrine.116 Said remedies include but are not 
limited to: (1) builders’ remedies; (2) requiring revision of the zoning 
ordinance at issue; and (3) in cases of noncompliance with an order of 
revision, the trial court has a right to force the municipality’s pen 
stroke of approval by ordering “that particular applications to 
construct housing that includes lower income units be approved by 
the municipality, or any officer, board, agency, authority (independent 
or otherwise) or division thereof.”117 
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in setting forth the Mount Laurel 
doctrine and aggressively refining it in Mount Laurel II, makes it 
abundantly clear that the judiciary will go to great lengths—including 
supplanting a municipality’s vested authority to approve individual 
construction applications—in the name of equal protection and due 
process, as applied to land use. 
iii. Prohibition Against Confiscation 
In AMG Associates v. Springfield Township, the Township enacted 
a zoning ordinance dividing a strip of lots into two types of zoning: 
the front of the lots facing the main street were zoned for business 
purposes, and the back of the lots, which faced side streets, were 
zoned for residential uses, resulting in “split lots.”118 The plaintiff’s 
property dimensions were such that, as a result of the split, the back 
portion of his lot was completely unusable for residential purposes, 
and consequently, a use variance was sought to use that portion of the 
lot for business purposes.119 The variance application before the 
Board of Adjustment received almost no push back; a full hearing 
 
115 Id. at 262, 456 A.2d at 443. 
116 Id. at 285–86, 456 A.2d at 455. 
117 Id. 
118 AMG Assocs. v. Twp. of Springfield, 65 N.J. 101, 103, 319 A.2d 705, 707 (N.J. 
1974). 
119 Id. at 104, 319 A.2d at 706. 
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was held and the Township offered no major opposition.120 The Board 
recommended to the Township Committee that the variance be 
granted, but the Committee refused, indicating that, “unusability was 
not considered to be a sufficient use variance ground.”121 The plaintiff 
initiated suit, the appellate division ruled in favor of the Township, 
and the plaintiff appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court.122 The 
court reversed, holding that: 
. . . in the split lot situation, an owner cannot validly be deprived of 
all reasonable utilization, for the benefit of another private 
landowner, of that portion of his land (beyond a de minimis 
situation) which otherwise, by reason of inability to meet the 
requirements of the zone in which it is situate, is practically 
unusable, yet remains subject to the burden of taxation.123 
Consequently, if a municipal zoning ordinance reduces a property to 
“idleness by restraint against all reasonable use,” the ordinance is 
“invalid as confiscatory and amounting to a taking without 
compensation.”124 
d. Ordinance Must Adhere to Procedural Requirements 
The last requirement of the Riggs four-part test is compliance with 
the MLUL and local municipal procedural requirements.125 
Procedural requirements listed in MLUL include, for example, a 
public notice of a hearing on adoption, revision or amendment to the 
Master Plan,126 a majority voting requirement for nonconformity with 
the Master Plan,127 and procedural requirements for preliminary major 
subdivision approval.128 
B. Presumption of Validity and Burden of Proof 
1. Presumption of Validity 
It is important to note that New Jersey courts have recognized that, 
generally, a municipality’s ordinances must be liberally construed in 
 
120 Id. at 107, 319 A.2d at 708. 
121 Id. at 108, 319 A.2d at 708. 
122 Id. at 111–12, 319 A.2d at 710. 
123 Id., 319 A.2d at 710–11. 
124 Id. at 112, 319 A.2d at 711. 
125 Riggs v. Twp. of Long Beach, 109 N.J. 601, 611, 538 A.2d 808, 813 (N.J. 1988). 
126 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-13(1) (2017). 
127 Id. § 40:55D-62(a). 
128 Id. § 40:55D-48. 
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the municipality’s favor.129 Although the avenues of invalidation have 
been discussed at length above, it is necessary to also note that land 
use ordinances are afforded a presumption of validity; this 
presumption, however, can be overcome by an “affirmative showing 
that the ordinance is arbitrary or unreasonable.”130 
In Bow & Arrow Manor v. Town of West Orange, the property 
owner was operating commercial enterprises as a permissible non-
conforming use, and challenged the rezoning ordinance that would 
limit the property to residential use.131 At issue was whether the 
owner’s property was properly rezoned as residential or if it should 
have been commercially zoned.132 The court found that deference 
must be given to the municipality in its position to consider the 
property residentially zoned.133 The court noted that because the area 
in question “is a fairly disputable area where commercial influences 
converge with residential ones . . . [t]he legislative judgment could 
reasonably go either way.”134 The court stated: 
 It is fundamental that zoning is a municipal legislative function, 
beyond the purview of interference by the courts unless [sic] an 
ordinance is seen in whole or in application to any particular 
property to be clearly arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or 
plainly contrary to fundamental principles of zoning or the statute. 
It is commonplace in municipal planning and zoning that there is 
frequently, and certainly here, a variety of possible zoning plans, 
districts, boundaries, and use restriction classifications, any of 
which would represent a defensible exercise of the municipal 
legislative judgment. It is not the function of the court to rewrite or 
annul a particular zoning scheme duly adopted by a governing body 
merely because the court would have done it differently or because 
the preponderance of the weight of the expert testimony adduced at 
 
129 Rumson Estates, Inc. v. Mayor of Fair Haven, 177 N.J. 338, 350, 828 A.2d 317, 325 
(N.J. 2003). 
130 Taxpayers Ass’n v. Weymouth Twp., 80 N.J. 6, 20, 364 A.2d 1016, 1024 (N.J. 
1976). Courts have consistently held that this presumption can be overcome. See, e.g., 
Bow & Arrow Manor, Inc. v. Town of West Orange, 63 N.J. 335, 350, 307 A.2d 563, 567 
(N.J. 1973); Harvard Enters. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Madison, 56 N.J. 362, 368, 266 A.2d 
588, 591 (1970); Vickers v. Twp. Comm. of Gloucester, 37 N.J. 232, 256, 181 A.2d 129, 
134 (N.J. 1962); Ward v. Twp. of Montgomery, 28 N.J. 529, 539, 147 A.2d 248, 253 (N.J. 
1959); Bellings v. Twp. of Denville, 96 N.J. Super. 351, 356, 233 A.2d 73, 76 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1967). 
131 Bow & Arrow Manor, Inc., 63 N.J. at 339, 307 A.2d at 565. 
132 Id. at 344–45, 307 A.2d at 567–68. 
133 Id. at 343, 307 A.2d at 567. 
134 Id. at 345, 307 A.2d at 568. 
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a trial is at variance with the local legislative judgment. If the latter 
is at least debatable it is to be sustained.135 
In giving deference to legislative judgment, affording a presumption 
of validity to the rezoning ordinance, and absent a finding that the 
ordinance was arbitrary and capricious, which would have overcome 
that presumption, the court found that the zoning ordinance enacted 
by the Town of West Orange was valid.136 
2. Burden of Proof 
To overcome the aforementioned presumption of validity, the party 
challenging the ordinance carries the burden of proof and must show 
that the ordinance “‘in whole or in application to any particular 
property’ is ‘clearly arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or plainly 
contrary to fundamental principles of zoning or the [zoning] 
statute.’”137 In this regard, courts have again allowed for a broad 
interpretation in favor of the municipality as to what constitutes a 
“reasonable” ordinance, setting forth a standard by which the 
challenging party must show that absolutely no reason exists for the 
ordinance.138 In Zilinksy v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of Verona, the 
court made this clear, stating: 
A mere difference of opinion as to how an ordinance will work will 
not lead to a conclusion of invalidity; “no discernible reason” [for 
the ordinance] is the requisite standard. . . . “[an ordinance] having 
some reasonable basis is not invalid merely because it is not made 
with mathematical nicety . . . [a]nd the [ordinance] must be upheld 
if any set of facts can reasonably be conceived to support it.”139 
In further refining what would render an ordinance “arbitrary, 
capricious or unreasonable, or plainly contrary to fundamental 
principles of zoning or the statute,” the New Jersey Supreme Court 
has held that courts should look to the relationship between the means 
and the ends of the ordinance: 
 
135 Id. at 343, 307 A.2d at 567 (emphasis added) (citing Kozesnik v. Montgomery 
Twp., 24 N.J. 154, 167, 131 A.2d 1,8 (N.J. 1957), and Vickers v. Twp. Comm. of 
Gloucester Twp., 37 N.J. 232, 242, 181 A.2d 129, 134 (N.J. 1962), cert. den. and app. 
dism., 371 U.S. 233 (1963)). 
136 Id. at 350, 307 A.2d at 571. 
137 Pheasant Bridge Corp. v. Twp. of Warren, 169 N.J. 282, 289, 777 A.2d 334, 338–39 
(N.J. 2001) (quoting Bow & Arrow Manor, Inc., 63 N.J. at 342, 307 A.2d at 567). 
138 Id. at 290, 777 A.2d at 339. 
139 Zilinsky v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 105 N.J. 363, 369, 521 A.2d 841, 844 (N.J. 
1987) (quoting David v. Vesta Co., 45 N.J. 301, 315, 212 A.2d 345, 352 (1965)). 
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[T]he means selected must have real and substantial relation to the 
object sought to be attained, and the regulation or proscription must 
be reasonably calculated to meet the evil and not exceed the public 
need or substantially affect uses which do not partake of the 
offensive character of those which cause the problem sought to be 
ameliorated.140 
In assessing the relationship between the means and the ends, courts 
require an examination of the reasonableness in light of the totality of 
the circumstances.141 Again, the burden is on the challenging party to 
show that the municipality has failed to act in accordance with this 
required standard.142 Further, absent a finding that the ordinance is 
unreasonable on its face, to meet the burden of proof and overcome 
the presumption of validity, the challenging party may make a 
showing “by extrinsic evidence of sufficient weight clearly 
establishing [the ordinance’s] unreasonableness.”143 
C. Immunity 
1. Immunity from MLUL: Municipality 
Two major questions posited in Hills of Troy Neighborhood 
Association v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills were (1) whether a 
municipality is exempt from its own local land use ordinances, and 
(2) whether such immunity, if afforded, carries over to private 
companies hired by the municipality.144 
First, the Hills court assessed whether the municipality had the 
authority to construct a communications tower without obtaining 
zoning approvals as required by MLUL and, specifically, the related 
municipal ordinances.145 The plaintiff sought an injunction preventing 
the Township from constructing a municipal communications and 
telecommunications tower at the local police headquarters.146 The 
plaintiff argued that the proposed tower construction did not comply 
 
140 Pheasant Bridge Corp., 169 N.J. at 290, 777 A.2d at 339 (quoting Kirsch Holding 
Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 251, 281 A.2d 513, 518 (N.J. 1971)). 
141 Id. at 290, 777 A.2d 334 at 339. 
142 Riggs v. Twp. of Long Beach, 109 N.J. 601, 611, 538 A.2d 808, 812 (1988); see 
also LaRue v. Twp. of East Brunswick, 68 N.J. Super. 435, 454, 172 A.2d 691, 701 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961). 
143 Bellington v. Twp of East Windsor, 32 N.J. Super. 243, 248, 108 A.2d 179, 182 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1954). 
144 Hills of Troy Neighborhood Ass’n v. Twp. of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 392 N.J. 
Super. 593, 597, 921 A.2d 1169, 1171 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2005). 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 597–98, 921 A.2d at 1170–72. 
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with the relevant municipal ordinance that imposed height restrictions 
and also required a certain distance be maintained between 
communications towers and residential areas.147 The Township 
countered that other locations had been explored and were not 
feasible for construction of the proposed tower.148 The Township also 
countered that the proposed height of the tower was necessary 
because a shorter tower, which was being used in the interim, was 
wholly inadequate and unreliable.149 Moreover, the Township asserted 
that the proposed tower was necessary to carry out the public purpose 
of “reliable and vital police, fire, emergency and municipal services 
and communications.”150 
In addressing the question of whether a municipality should be 
granted immunity from its own land use ordinances in order to carry 
out a public purpose, the Hills court ultimately held that the 
municipality is not restrained by the local prohibitive ordinance, and 
because the municipality was serving a public need, the municipal 
authority to do so could not be circumvented by the local 
ordinance.151 The court explained that “[t]he need of a public building 
in a certain location ought to be determined by the . . . municipal 
authority, and its determination on the question of necessary or 
desirable location cannot be interfered with by a local zoning 
ordinance.”152 
The court cautioned, however, that a municipality’s power to avoid 
compliance with local ordinances must be “reasonably exercised in 
response to the public need.”153 Furthermore, the court, in exempting 
the municipality from the purview of local ordinances requiring 
zoning approvals, still required review of the municipality’s proposed 
action.154 The court stated: 
That review is not in the nature of satisfying the positive and 
negative criteria for a use variance, rendering exemption from 
 
147 Id. at 599, 921 A.2d at 1171–72. 
148 Id., 921 A.2d at 1172. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 608–10, 921 A.2d at 1178–79. 
152 Id. at 600, 921 A.2d at 1172 (quoting Thornton v. Village of Ridgewood, 17 N.J. 
499, 513, 111 A.2d 899, 906 (N.J. 1955)). 
153 Id. at 601, 921 A.2d at 1173 (quoting Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 20 
N.J. 275, 285, 119 A.2d 761, 767 (N.J. 1956)). 
154 Id. at 603–04, 921 A.2d at 1175. 
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zoning regulation meaningless. Instead, our developed case law . . . 
requires a municipality to act reasonably in this regard by focusing 
on such factors as the kind of function or land use involved, the 
extent of the public interest to be served, the deviation from a 
municipality’s zone plan and the impact on surrounding properties. 
In this context, the consideration of alternative sites is necessary as 
it minimizes the deviation from the zone plan and impact upon 
surrounding properties. Further, that analysis is not complete unless 
the municipality has afforded the public a meaningful opportunity 
to be heard on these factors . . . .155 
2. Immunity from MLUL: Private Enterprises Hired by Municipality 
Next, the court in Hills turned to the question of whether immunity, 
if afforded, carries over to private companies hired by the 
municipality, as the Township had assigned construction of the 
proposed tower to two private enterprises, Sprint and Omnipoint.156 
The plaintiff asserted that, as private companies, Sprint and 
Omnipoint were not exempt from the ordinances even if the 
municipality was exempt, and, as such, had to apply for appropriate 
variance approvals.157 The plaintiff argued that because the two 
companies were private companies, the construction would advance 
their private financial interest and the construction, consequently, was 
not for a public purpose.158 The court rejected this position.159  In so 
doing, the court set forth required considerations to assess whether a 
private enterprise, engaged in work at the behest of the municipality, 
is promoting the municipality’s public purpose.160 To be considered 
are: (1) the reasons why the municipality entered into a partnership 
with a private enterprise; (2) the type of public interest to be served 
thereby at the particular location; (3) the nature of the private 
enterprise; and (4) weighing the same against the private benefits 
obtained.161 If, after such examination, the public interest outweighs 
any other interest, the private company is also exempt from the local 
ordinance.162 The Hills court noted that, “[m]unicipalities will always 
have the power to contract with private enterprises on municipal land 
projects and as long as those agreements are for an overriding public 
 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 598, 921 A.2d at 1174–75. 
157 Id. at 599, 921 A.2d at 1172. 
158 Id. at 606, 921 A.2d at 1176. 
159 Id. at 609–10, 921 A.2d at 1178–79. 
160 Id. at 608–09, 921 A.2d at 1178. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 609, 921 A.2d at 1178. 
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purpose, zoning exemptions exercised reasonably should apply to the 
private companies.”163 
The court in Aviation Services, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, also 
emphasized the importance of a property’s usage for public purpose/ 
need as the prime factor in assessing whether a private company is 
immune from local land use ordinances.164 In Aviation Services, the 
Town of Morristown acquired land within the boundary of the 
Township of Hanover, and thereafter entered into an agreement with 
the federal government to develop the property for airport services.165 
Hanover Township subsequently enacted a zoning ordinance that 
incorporated the land into a residential zone and effectively excluded 
airports within the zone.166 Plaintiff-lessee, a private corporation and a 
party to a lease with Morristown, operated its aviation business out of 
a building in the airport.167 Morristown, an intervener, argued that 
“the airport operation constitute[d] an essential governmental function 
serving the public need and by virtue of its nature is immune to the 
zoning power of Hanover Township.”168 Hanover Township argued 
that the use of the airport was “proprietary,” and, as such, the airport 
should not be afforded any immunity insomuch as it should be treated 
as a private corporation.169 
The court first acknowledged that airport operation has long been 
recognized as serving a public need.170 The court then looked to 
relevant statutory language, which provided that a municipality 
(Morristown, in this case) could acquire and lease property for the 
operation of an airport.171 Comprehensively, Morristown prevailed 
against the Hanover ordinance because the court found that (1) 
airports serve a public purpose and are a governmental function; (2) 
the relevant statutes indicate that a municipality has authority to 
acquire and lease property for the operation of an airport, inside or 
outside its borders; (3) the U.S. government contracted with the 
 
163 Id. 
164 Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 20 N.J. 284, 289, 119 A.2d 764, 766–67 
(N.J. 1956). 
165 Id. at 275, 278, 119 A.2d at 761, 763. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 280, 119 A.2d at 764. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 280–81, 119 A.2d at 764–65. 
171 Id. at 283, 119 A.2d at 765. 
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municipality specifically to operate an airport (thereby activating 
eminent domain authority); and (4) the legislative intent of relevant 
statutory language would be controverted and frustrated by the local 
ordinance if the airport was not immune.172 The court cautioned that 
“[i]f the purposes sought to be achieved are to be thwarted by zoning 
plans which arbitrarily exclude airport uses from an entire municipal 
domain, the progress envisioned by the Legislature and stimulated by 
this statute may go unrecognized.”173 
Thus, the Plaintiff-lessee, a private enterprise, prevailed against 
Hanover and was immune from the Hanover ordinance by virtue of 
Morristown’s immunity and rights enumerated above. Specifically, 
Morristown had a right to act as a lessor of property used as an 
airport—a public need—which immunized the private enterprise, the 
lessee of the property. 
3. Immunity from MLUL: Superior Governmental Authority 
The court in Aviation Services also peripherally addressed the role 
of the federal government in the case, insomuch as there was a 
“bestowal of the power of eminent domain [to Morristown] to 
subserve the [airport] program.”174 In analyzing this aspect of the 
case, the court made an important and often-cited finding that, “where 
the immunity from local zoning regulation is claimed by any agency 
or authority which occupies a superior position in the governmental 
hierarchy, the presumption is that such immunity was intended in the 
absence of express statutory language to the contrary.”175 In Aviation 
Services, as well as subsequent cases that cited the aforementioned 
language, a superior government is afforded a presumptive exemption 
from local municipal land use ordinances unless there is express 
statutory language surrendering that immunity.176 However, as 
illustrated below, not all courts have required express statutory 
 
172 Id. at 284, 289, 119 A.2d at 764, 766–67. 
173 Id. at 283, 119 A.2d at 766. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 282, 119 A.2d at 765; see Town of Bloomfield v. N.J. Highway Auth., 18 N.J. 
237, 249, 113 A.2d 658, 665 (N.J. 1955) (absent a legislative provision to the contrary, the 
State Highway Authority was not subject to the municipal zoning ordinance). See also 
Mayor of Kearny v. Clark, 213 N.J. Super. 152, 155, 516 A.2d 1126, 1127 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1986) (holding county was immune to Kearny’s zoning ordinances related to the 
construction of a jail). 
176 Aviation Servs., Inc., 20 N.J. at 282, 119 A.2d at 765; see also sources cited supra 
note 175. 
SEDARAT (DO NOT DELETE) 5/30/2018  1:50 PM 
2018] New Jersey Municipal Land Use Law:  195 
Constitutional Origin, Judicial Parameters 
language to overcome the aforementioned presumption of immunity 
but, rather, have looked to legislative intent to do so. 
The 1972 case, Rutgers v. Piluso, was such a case, where the New 
Jersey Supreme Court took a slightly different approach from the 
court in Aviation Services.177 The issue in Piluso was whether 
Rutgers, a state university, was exempt from a municipality’s local 
zoning ordinance that affected one of Rutgers’ campuses.178 The 
relevant municipal zoning ordinance allowed for an unlimited number 
of dormitory housing units for unmarried students but limited the 
number of units available to students who were married and had 
families.179 Having reached the permissible limit for family units, 
Rutgers sought to build additional family housing units to 
accommodate the students and their families.180 The municipality’s 
Board of Adjustment denied Rutgers’ application on the grounds of 
the restriction in the aforementioned ordinance and denied Rutgers’ 
subsequent application for a variance to allow for the construction of 
the housing units.181 Rutgers accordingly initiated suit.182 
The court found that “municipal zoning regulation of state 
university property can, and in the case before us certainly would, 
very materially interfere with the development and growth of the 
institution, for the benefit of all the people of the state, as planned and 
felt necessary by the educational authorities.”183 Moreover, the court 
found that the ultimate test in granting immunity is the determination 
of legislative intent, while considering the totality of the facts and 
circumstances relevant to the case at bar.184 Indeed the court made 
sure to emphasize that no formula existed or should exist in this 
regard: 
[Legislative] intent, rarely specifically expressed, is to be divined 
from a consideration of many factors, with a value judgment 
reached on an overall evaluation. . . . The most obvious and 
common [factors] include the nature and scope of the 
instrumentality seeking immunity, the kind of function or land use 
involved, the extent of the public interest to be served thereby, the 
 
177 Rutgers v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142, 286 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1972). 
178 Id. at 146, 286 A.2d at 698. 
179 Id. at 147, 286 A.2d at 699. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 150, 286 A.2d at 701. 
184 Id. at 152–53, 286 A.2d at 702–03. 
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effect local land use regulation would have upon the enterprise 
concerned and the impact upon legitimate local interests. . . . In 
some instances one factor will be more influential than another or 
may be so significant as to completely overshadow all others. . . . 
The point is that there is no precise formula or set of criteria which 
will determine every case mechanically and automatically.185 
In examining the totality of the aforementioned factors, the court 
ultimately sided with the state university, finding that it was exempt 
from the relevant municipal ordinance.186 Unlike Aviation Services, 
which presumed immunity absent express legislative language 
otherwise, the starting point in Piluso for determining whether 
superior governments are immune from local municipal land use 
ordinances was legislative intent (without the requirement for express 
language), determined by an analysis of the factors set forth above.187 
In the 1982 case, United Building & Construction Trades Council 
v. Mayor of Camden, the New Jersey Supreme Court utilized a slight 
variation from both the 1972 Piluso approach and the 1956 Aviation 
Services approach to superior governmental immunity against local 
municipal land use ordinances.188 In United Building, the court relied 
on the concept of federal preemption in drawing the conclusion that a 
local ordinance will be preempted if the state legislature intended, 
either expressly or impliedly, to be exclusive in the field.189 Further, 
the court also noted that liberal construction in favor of the local 
municipality must be afforded, and that the legislative intention to 
supersede must be clearly present.190 
Although it is clear that variations exist with regard to the way the 
New Jersey Supreme Court has addressed immunity of superior 
governments against local municipal ordinances, the general rule is 
consistent: a governmental authority superior to a municipality is 
afforded immunity with regard to local municipal land use 
ordinances, but this immunity is not unrestricted—it is subject to 
express legislative language or implied legislative intent. 
 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 158, 286 A.2d at 705. 
187 Id. at 151–52 n.4, 286 A.2d 702; see also Aviation Servs. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 20 
N.J. 275, 282, 119 A.2d 761, 765 (N.J. 1956). 
188 United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 88 N.J. 317, 343, 443 
A.2d 148, 161 (N.J. 1982), rev’d on other grounds, 465 U.S. 208 (1984). 
189 Id.; see also Rumson Estates, Inc. v. Mayor of Fair Haven, 177 N.J. 338, 828 A.2d 
317 (N.J. 2003). 
190 United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 88 N.J. at 343, 443 A.2d at 161. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is evident that the MLUL provides ample framework for 
municipalities to set forth comprehensive municipal land use 
ordinances. Those ordinances, in turn, are the prescription for conduct 
related to local land use for both governmental and nongovernmental 
actors. However, at the most preliminary stage of scrutiny, these 
ordinances must serve the general welfare as an exercise of police 
power, and must strictly comply with the MLUL. 
Furthermore, municipal land use ordinances must satisfy all four 
criteria of the Riggs test. Ordinances are presumed valid, and that 
presumption is overcome by a showing that the ordinance or the 
conduct related thereto is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. The 
burden of proof for such a showing is on the challenger. Additionally, 
immunity from municipal ordinances is afforded in limited situations. 
Municipalities are immune to ordinances if their conduct is promoting 
a public purpose in a governmental function. Private enterprises are 
immune if they are contracted with the municipality to do work in 
furtherance of the aforementioned public purpose or if they are a 
lessee in a lease with the municipality and that lease is immune by 
virtue of its promotion of a specified public purpose. Lastly, superior 
governments, i.e., the state or the federal government, are immune 
from municipal ordinances absent express or implied legislative intent 
which would waive that immunity. These mandates, set forth by the 
judiciary in its interpretation of the MLUL, illuminate the 
foundational parameters, limitations, and reach of New Jersey local 
land use laws. 
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